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ABSTRACT: Can the language of philosophy adequately articulate emptiness and nothingness?
Rather, might poetry articulate that which conventional philosophical writing fails to achieve?
Tasked with articulating the very nature of emptiness is Keiji Nishitani (Japanese philosopher
and prominent scholar of the Kyoto School). In his seminal book entitled Religion and
Nothingness, Nishitani discusses at length the standpoint of śūnyatā (otherwise known as
emptiness). In many ways, Nishitani eloquently situates into dialogue both poetry and
philosophy with the goal of unravelling a deeper understanding of the human condition. By
employing poetry throughout his work, Nishitani capitalizes on the experiential and aesthetic
contributions of poetry to more clearly and effectively articulate his philosophy: “the poet’s
words can be the philosopher’s tools, codes and modes of reflection and judgement, of
contemplation and enunciation” (Ranjan Ghosh, “The Agonizing Agon: Meditations on
Conjugality”). From logos and the rationality of thought to experience and the aesthetics of
feeling, this paper interrogates our conventional modes of philosophizing and considers more
poetical means of apprehending our natures and emptiness at large. In short, this paper argues
that the poetry employed by Nishitani throughout Religion and Nothingness serves as an
aesthetic and experiential mode of communication to more clearly and effectively articulate his
philosophical project of conveying the unconveyable, that is, the standpoint of śūnyatā
(emptiness). By employing poetry, Nishitani does not undermine the philosophical nature of his
project. Rather, poetry achieves the same ends as philosophy, only the modes in which they
articulate meaning often differ.
Word Count: 3380
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The Poetics of Śūnyatā: Conveying the Unconveyable of Emptiness
We designate names and terms to encapsulate the world into something knowable,
something which may be conquered and domesticated by the human intellect. On the other hand,
if we fail to uncover meaning or reconcile the irreconcilable, we concede ignorance to arrive at
hasty conclusions. In our attempt to encapsulate meaning, we call writing that follows meter or
rhyme scheme “poetry” and deep contemplative thought of the universe and human condition
“philosophy.” But does not poetry too entail deep contemplative thought? Likewise, cannot
philosophy too follow the cadence and eloquence of language that is normally attributed to
poetry and literature?1 We might understand poetry as the produced creative labour of deep
contemplative thought. If “brevity is the soul of wit,” as William Shakespeare claims, poetry is
the succinct contemplation of thought. What is more, poetry is philosophy—only without the
argument from opposition. While we may not say for certain that poetry and philosophy are
identical in nature, they do however seem to serve the same end. This teleological end might be
understood as unravelling our human nature, which frequently eludes our comprehension. But
“Who today would presume to claim that he is at home with the nature of poetry as well as with
the nature of thinking and, in addition, strong enough to bring the nature of the two into the most
extreme discord and so to establish their concord?” (qtd. in Bosteels 244). This was spoken by
Martin Heidegger—Keiji Nishitani’s contemporary—from “What Are Poets For?” In many
ways, Nishitani eloquently situates into dialogue both poetry and philosophy with the goal of
unveiling some deeper aspect of the human condition. By employing poetry (in his seminal work
entitled Religion and Nothingness), Nishitani does not relegate or undermine the philosophical
nature of his project. Rather, poetry achieves the same ends as philosophy, only the modes in
which they articulate meaning often differ. But it is here that Nishitani capitalizes on the
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experiential and aesthetic contributions of poetry to more clearly and effectively articulate his
philosophy: “the poet’s words can be the philosopher’s tools, codes and modes of reflection and
judgement, of contemplation and enunciation” (Ghosh 5-6).
This paper argues that the poetry employed by Nishitani serves as an aesthetic and
experiential mode of communication to more clearly and effectively articulate his philosophical
project of conveying the unconveyable, that is, the standpoint of śūnyatā (emptiness). By
employing poetry throughout Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani reaches a deeper
understanding of the human condition, one that goes beyond conventional philosophical writing,
one that the language of philosophy may fail to achieve. We will first consider Nishitani’s view
that the standpoint of śūnyatā is required in order to authentically apprehend the meaning of
poetry. From this, we will contend that Nishitani employs poetry to convey the unconveyable
through the aesthetic and experiential mode that poetry provides. Next, we consider how poetry
conveys “being-time” as opposed to a sequential chronology of time. Finally, we see how the
application of poetry challenges the nihilism which punctuates Western civilization.
In section four of chapter five entitled “Śūnyatā and Time,” Nishitani comments on the
symbolic nature of poetic verse, referencing the following passage from an unnamed Zen master:
“’Flowers cover the mountainsides like brocade, the valley stream deepens into an indigo-like
pool’” (190). Here, Nishitani condemns the human tendency to perceive poetic verse as
inhabiting a rational structure or a form of symbolism: “we must not stick to the literal meaning
of the words by reading them in rational terms and transforming them into logos, so that the
mountain flowers and valley streams, fleeting as they are, become appearances or symbols of
some kind of unchanging, enduring dharma body” (190). “Meaningless in terms of logos,” the
systematized or mechanized process of rendering the poetic verse inevitably fails to capture its
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true and authentic meaning. In order for the subject to apprehend the poem’s true meaning, one
must first reach the “point of absolute nonobjectifiability”—“a point that withdraws beyond all
reason and logos and can only open up in the Existenz of the dropping off of body-and-mind”
(Nishitani 188-189). For the sake of clarity and consistency, this “nonobjectifiability” is also
understood as “samādhi-being,” “position,” and the standpoint of śūnyatā (the home-ground)
(Nishitani 189). Specifically, Nishitani defines śūnyatā as “the point at which we become
manifest in our own suchness as concrete human beings” (90). Nishitani evaluates poetry and its
words from the standpoint of emptiness, or śūnyatā, as the ultimate ground on which to
accurately apprehend its meaning. Without this standpoint, we render meaning into “a mere
explanatory logic” which invariably dispels the meaning of poetic verse or word. Therefore, it is
crucial that we “listen to it from the home-ground out of which it proceeds, to weigh it well and
affirm its kokoro (‘mind’ or ‘meaning’) in order to truly understand what it means” (Nishitani
190). In this sense, the poem may only be understood authentically in its “suchness” once the
home-ground is reached. “From this ground,” he continues, “the koto of the brocadelike
mountain flowers and indigolike water is imbued with a peculiar, inexhaustible meaning” (190).
All things considered, the authentic meaning and beauty of the poem, for Nishitani, is only
perceived on the home-ground of śūnyatā, at the “point of absolute nonobjectifiability.” Having
now considered his assessment of poetry as it is understood from the perspective of emptiness, to
what end does Nishitani include poetry throughout his philosophical project?
As we will see, poetry is used to help experientially situate one within the field of
śūnyatā. Nishitani references and rearticulates much of the poetry and philosophy of the haiku
poet Bashō. One poem of his cited twice in Religion and Nothingness is the following:
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From the pine tree
learn of the pine tree,
And from the bamboo
of the bamboo. (qtd. in Nishitani 128, 195)
This poem derives from a longer commentary by Bashō. When we consider Nishitani’s
comments on poetry from the perspective of emptiness juxtaposed against Bashō’s longer
commentary, we encounter some similarities:
Go to the pine if you want to learn about the pine, or to the bamboo if you want to learn
about the bamboo. And in doing so, you must leave your subjective preoccupation with
yourself. Otherwise you impose yourself on the object and do not learn. Your poetry
issues of its own accord when you and the object have become one—when you have
plunged deep enough into the object to see something like a hidden glimmering there.
However well phrased your poetry may be, if your feeling is not natural—if the object
and yourself are separate—then your poetry is not true poetry but merely your subjective
counterfeit (qtd. in Wilkinson 51).
Nishitani and Bashō’s language here is strikingly similar. While this paper does not assume
Nishitani is directly inspired by Bashō’s own philosophy, Nishitani does consistently reference
Bashō’s work. A commonality between both of their arguments concern the coming-togetherness
of the subject and object (the person to the poem). Bashō posits that poetry “issues of its own
accord when you and the object have become one.” Likewise, Nishitani posits that “we need to
listen to it from the home-ground out of which it proceeds . . . in order truly to understand what it
means.” Simply put, both argue for the removal of binary or oppositional structures, the object to
subject model, and instead advocate for a single togetherness or unison of the two parts.
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From Nishitani’s understanding of Bashō’s poem, we can see how it relates to the
standpoint of śūnyatā. Bashō’s poem is purposefully introduced in “The Standpoint of Śūnyatā”
chapter. The poem is employed to articulate the standpoint of śūnyatā, “the point at which the
self is truly on its own home-ground” (110). “The centre,” states Nishitani, “represents the point
at which the being of things is constituted in unison with emptiness” (130). It is here that the
dichotomy between subject and object breaks down into the “unison with emptiness.” Similar to
how Nishitani condemns rendering words into “rational terms” and “transforming them into a
logos,” the poem challenges this process insofar as it can only be aesthetically experienced and is
otherwise “meaningless” if filtered through the logical mind. Nishitani warns against
“observ[ing] the pine tree carefully” or “study[ing] the pine tree scientifically” (128). “[Bashō]
means for us to enter into the mode of being where the pine tree is the pine tree itself, and the
bamboo is the bamboo itself,” Nishitani clarifies, “and from there to look at the pine tree and the
bamboo” (128).
Nishitani does not straightforwardly address the reason for which he frequently includes
poetry throughout Religion and Nothingness; however, as this paper contends, poetry provides
the aesthetic and experiential mode by which to appreciate and understand the unconveyable. I
use the words “aesthetic” and “experience” because they do not connote a rationality or logos of
understanding. Rather, these words connote a “suchness” and being in time with something, a
notion which Nishitani frequently articulates throughout his book. It should be noted that
Nishitani uses the word “sensation,” whereas I speak of “aesthetic” and “experience.”
Furthermore, I consider poetry as “aesthetic” for it more closely aligns with art, and when read or
heard, gives us a sense of the beautiful or sentimental. “[Poetry] is not about something; it
merely is, the presence of presence,” writes Cecilia Sjöholm: “It engages with an interlocuter that
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is interiorized” (70). Here, Sjöholm hints at how poetry conveys the unconveyable. Poetry is not
conveyed, that is, it does not transfer an idea from one location to another. Rather, poetry
manifests within the self and makes known that which is forever fleeting—an aesthetic
experience which possesses the perceptible, the observer.2 As for śūnyatā, you cannot convey
emptiness; you can only experience it. To experience emptiness is to concede our rational
faculty. In Zen Buddhism the function of koans is to frustrate human intellect and rationality
with paradoxical statements. Instead, the mind is meant to intuitively apprehend meaning without
rationality. By attempting to convey emptiness, one creates a binary of subject and object. We
reduce emptiness to a something-ness when explained through rationality. Therefore, it is the
mode of poetry which works to resolve this dilemma of experiencing emptiness with its
experiential and aesthetic mode of communication—not a mode of thinking, but an intuitive
mode of feeling. Our conventional understanding of philosophy might suggest we read an
argument and now the idea has been conveyed to our mind. But this conventional mode will not
suffice when we attempt to gather an authentic understanding of the standpoint of śūnyatā.
Nishitani further explains this interiorized manifestation when commenting on Bashō’s poem:
“He calls on us to betake ourselves to the dimension where things become manifest in their
suchness, to attune ourselves to the selfness of the pine tree and the selfness of the bamboo”
(128). This is not a conceptualized and personalized perception of an object from the
perspective-consumption of the perceiver, for this is an attribution of the self onto the object—
the rose’s beauty is beautiful insofar as we conventionally understand the rose to be beautiful.
The beauty we see in the rose is a beauty of our own selves, the worldview we have constructed
and delineated to be beautiful. By contrast, Nishitani advocates for a unified perspective from the
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pine tree and bamboo itself in themselves, not from the position as ourselves as estranged from
the pine tree and bamboo, but “the selfness of the pine tree and the selfness of the bamboo.”
This paper does not seriously investigate Heidegger’s thoughts on poetry as they
influence Nishitani’s own; however, because Nishitani worked alongside Heidegger, it might
well be supposed that Heidegger’s consideration of poetry had advantageously influenced
Nishitani’s own affinity for poetry, as shown by his frequent use of poetry in order to convey and
support his arguments. “Philosophy and poetry, for Heidegger,” writes Bruno Bosteels, “share a
common mission in this unique task of thinking time, understood both ontologically and
historically” (249). No doubt Nishitani also employs poetry to conceive of time when he cites the
following poem:
Every morning the sun ascends in the east,
every night the moon descends in the west.
Clouds retreat, the mountain bones are bared,
rain passes, the surrounding hills are low. (188, 197)
In this case, poetry conveys the “Existenz”—which Nishitani understands as true time—as
“bottomlessly in time, or as time that has bottomlessly arrived at the fullness of time,” or
alternatively (if you prefer the incomprehensible), “Time is not time, therefore it is time”
(Nishitani 197). Here again we see the unconveyable and impossible to rationalize framework—
“Time is not time, therefore it is time.” The provided poem works to rectify the irreconcilable
through its aesthetic sense impression. From the poem we understand the seemingly
contradictory statement as an aesthetic and experiential mode. The sun ascends eastward, and in
contrast, the moon descends westward; this is a complete inversion intimately knitted in the
poem as the selfsame structure; together they connote a unified whole. The world changes—
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“Clouds retreat” and “rain passes”—but there is no passing of time, only an experience of the
moment—“the fullness of time” (Nishitani 197). In other words, poetry resituates and
rearticulates existence, producing an ordered field from which we may interpret our existence.
Filtered through the mode of the poem, we can understand these two contradictory impressions
as one in the same. In this sense, we might understand the poem as acting on the field of
emptiness: “Emptiness is the field on which an essential encounter can take place between
entities normally taken to be most distantly related, even at enmity with each other” (Nishitani
102). Bosteels notes that “philosophers must learn to listen to what poets have to say in terms of
the essential link between time and being. For Heidegger, this is not just a theme or a subject
matter for a calculative reckoning but involves nothing less than the destiny of an age of the
world in which a privileged mission is assigned to the poets” (249). The conventional framework
in which we understand time—past, present and future—blends or synthesizes into a unified
whole. The sequential order of our days with the sun ascending into the east and moon
descending into the west are no longer segregated by time but combine together into a “beingtime” conveniently afforded by the poem.
To further explain how poetry encapsulates a beingness with time, let us consider
Shakespeare’s “Sonnet 18”:
Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day?
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Thou art more lovely and more temperate:
Rough winds do shake the darling buds of May,
And summer’s lease hath all too short a date:
Sometime too hot the eye of heaven shines,
And often is his gold complexion dimmed;
And every fair from fair sometime declines,
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By chance, or nature’s changing course, untrimmed:
But thy eternal summer shall not fade,
Nor lose possession of that fair thou ow’st;
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Nor shall Death brag thou wander’st in his shade
When in eternal lines to time thou grow’st:
So long as men can breathe or eyes can see,
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.
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Buddhism, on which Nishitani bases much of his philosophy, challenges the traditionally futureoriented time of the West. However, much like Nishitani’s own project, Shakespeare’s poem
challenges the nihility and nothingness which perturbs and denigrates the mind: that is, when the
last molecule of dust that bears the signature of our name perishes and is known no more. T.S.
Eliot explains this fear best when he writes, “I will show you fear in a handful of dust” (“The
Waste Land”).3 Hence, the poem provides a “transmigration” beyond the field of nihility which
forever threatens our mortality. Shakespeare’s sonnet makes known the perpetual time-oriented
tug-of-war that lassoes humanity of the yoke by which we are bound. The lines of the poem are
“eternal,” and though time “grow’st,” our “eternal summer shall not fade” and “Nor shall Death
brag thou wander’st in his shade,” for the poem bears our name and saves us from the nihility
that forever attempts to forget us. In this sense, the “Death” here is the “nihility” spoken of by
Nishitani. The poem “gives life to thee” as a signature of our existence and pays tribute to our
inherent meaning as human beings. One may interpret the poem as simply an attempt to woo a
beloved; however, some scholars figure the poem is meant to immortalize the death of
Shakespeare’s son Hamnet. Shakespeare inspires life and existence into that which is lost. In
many ways, Nishitani’s own project is to equip us with our own meaning and agency; his project
is one of bestowing meaning—an antidote to nihilism. A wordsmith in his own right, Nishitani
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capitalizes on the meaning bestowing structure of poems in tandem with his art of philosophy.
This paper has attempted to highlight how the poetry employed by Nishitani better articulates
and experientially conveys his project of reclaiming meaning into our lives and existence at
large.
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Endnotes
1. The disembodied scholarly voice of the philosopher is elevated with the aesthetic beauty
of poetry. Poetry is also a form of dialectic, an intellectual midwifery in which the
philosopher’s voice (Nishitani) is weighed against an alternate perspective. Through the
intellectual intercourse of the philosopher and poet, we arrive at a wholly unique
conclusion that might never have been reached without the dialogue of these two
philosophical modes.
2. “The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen / Turns them to shapes and gives to airy
nothing / A local habitation and a name” (Midsummer Night’s Dream 5.1.1845-47).
3. Nishitani notably refers to Eliot’s “The Waste Land” on page fifty-one for it conveys the
nihility of modernism.
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